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THE GOVERNMENTAL MAINTENANCE OF THE
PRIVILEGES OF LEGAL ACADEMIA: A CASE
STUDY IN CLASSIC RENT-SEEKING AND A
CHALLENGE TO OUR DEMOCRATIC
IDEOLOGY
JOHN S. ELSON*
I. LEGAL ACADEMIA - ANOTHER RENT-SEEKING CARTEL?
America's legal education establishment is in an especially
celebratory mood these days. With the appointment of a new
Consultant to the ABA Section of Legal Education and the
retirement of its past long-time Consultant, we are hearing again
what has become the credo of America's legal education
establishment: we have the finest system of legal education in the
world.1 I suggest this celebratory mood is ill-deserved. There is no
cause: to celebrate a system that limits competition in the legal
services market so effectively that vast numbers of Americans
cannot afford critical legal services; 2 to celebrate a system that is so
costly that the non-wealthy are either priced out of legal education
* Professor of Law and Assistant Director of the legal clinic at Northwestern Law School. B.A.,
Harvard University; J.D., M.A., University of Chicago. Professor Elson has been involved
extensively in the American Bar Association's section of Legal Education and Admission to
the Bar. He has been a member of the Accreditation Committee, the Bar Admissions
Committee, the Chair of the Skills Training Committee and served on numerous site
inspection teams.
1 For example, the new Consultant, John Sebert, stated in a speech honoring his
predecessor: "We now have the best system of legal education in the world, and also the best
system of accreditation of legal education institutions." Syllabus, vol. 31, no. p. 10 (Winter
2000).
2 See Roy Abrams, Are There Too Many Lawyers? N.J. L.J., Feb. 13, 1995, at 23 (discussing
lack of lawyers serving middle class); Court Finds 'Obligation' to Assign Counsel for Indigent Man
Charged with Violations; People v. Daniel Louis, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 1999, at 25 (stating many
people can not afford legal representation); Stephanie Simon, Cut-Rate Legal Eagles, L.A. TIMES,
June 7,1996, at Al (quoting UCLA Professor of Law Richard Sander, stating "an awfully large
segment of the American Population does not have access to the legal system").
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entirely or must take on tremendous debt;3 or to celebrate a system
that fails to prepare most students to meet the initial challenges of
law practice. 4
No doubt our legal education system does serve very well, and
perhaps better than that of any other country, the interests of
established legal educators, most lawyers and, perhaps, the
wealthier segments of the business community. The reason for this
is not, however, as the celebrators would have it, that our system of
legal education is effective, efficient or fair. It is none of these things,
a point that should be painfully obvious to anyone concerned about
most Americans' inability to afford legal services or legal
education.5
The primary reason American legal education so effectively
entrenches the wealthy and denies access to the non-wealthy is that
it operates as a rent-seeking cartel which in its essential aspects acts
just like other industry cartels that use governmental restrictions on
market entry in order to boost their members' profits.6 Here, I define
rent-seeking in a conventional, but very restricted sense, as the
phenomenon by which a cartel obtains governmentally imposed
restrictions on entry to the market in which the cartel members sell
their goods or services in order that they can obtain higher profits
than they otherwise would in open market competition.7 It should
be noted, however, that the law professor cartel is somewhat
different from the typical trade group cartel in that their insulation
from competitive market pressures gives faculty protection not only
3 See Claudia MacLachlan, Doing Well vs. Doing Good, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 4, 2000, at 50
(stating median law school debt currently hovers around $80,000 per student); see also
Symposium, Legal Ethics, An Informal Discussion on Legal Ethics, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS
427, 436 (1999) (stating students are inclined to take high paying jobs with large law firms and
not serve poor and middle classes due to huge debt).
4 See Robert Coles, The LSAT - Reflection on an Experience, 34 J. LEGAL EDuC. 412, 422 (1984)
(questioning whether law schools have anything to do with good lawyering); Timothy W.
Floyd, Legal Education and the Vision Thing, 31 GA. L. REV. 853, 856 (stating that law school
curricula focuses too much on legal doctrine rather than on the roles of attorneys in society, in
part since most law professors were not in practice very long).
5 See Josh Ard, Crossing the Bar - The Column of the Legal Education Committee - Serving over
the Net: Legal Education over the Internet, 79 MICH. BAR J. 1050 (discussing how on-line
education may reduce cost of law school and open doors to segments of population
traditionally left out).
6 See generally Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's Decisionmaking
Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 860-64 (1996) (stating some economists view some
professions, like law, medicine and clergy, as rent seeking cartels because these professions
are self-regulating); Jane Byeff Korn, Collective Rights and Individual Remedies: Rebalancing the
Balance after Lingel v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1298 (1990).
7 See generally Goldstein, supra note 6, at 860-64; Korn, supra note 6, at 1298.
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from price competition, but also from teaching competition, a
luxury that enables them to write the myriad of articles that the
market would not otherwise support.
The lynch-pin of the cartel is, of course, ABA accreditation. The
forty-five state supreme courts that have made graduation from an
ABA accredited law school a prerequisite for admission to the bar 8
have given those schools effective monopoly power over the legal
education industry.
The defenders of the status-quo argue that this concentration of
power in ABA accreditation is necessary to uphold minimum
standards of legal education, a proposition I shall dispute.9 What I
suggest is not a matter of dispute, however, is that the accreditation
system's restrictions on market entry limit the availability and the
diversity of both legal education and legal services and, thereby,
impose substantial social costs.10 This conclusion follows from some
elementary economic realities. (1) Lowering the cost barriers to
entrance into the ranks of accredited law schools would enable
lower cost providers of legal education to enter the legal education
market. (2) As a result of the greater number of lower cost providers
of legal education, the minimum costs of becoming a lawyer would
decrease and the number of lawyers who could enter and survive in
the legal services market would correspondingly increase. (3) The
resulting increased competition among the greater number of
lawyers would reduce the cost of many types of legal services,
thereby, making such services more available to the non-wealthy. (4)
Finally, the greater competition in the legal education marketplace
would also likely lead to more diversity and innovation in
educational programming and more specialization with respect to
8 See Mark E. Dykstra, Why Can't Johnny Sit for the Idaho Bar? The Unfair Effect of ADA
Accreditation Standards on State Bar Admission Requirements, 3 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 285, 289-90
(1995) (discussing fundamental unfairness of ABA imposed standards on graduates of non-
accredited law schools); see also James P. White, Supreme Courts as Regulators in the Law: State
Supreme Courts as Regulators of the Profession, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1997)
(discussing how state supreme courts continue to maintain a leading position in requiring
ABA accreditation).
9 See Andrew Portinga, Note, ABA Accreditation of Law Schools: An Antitrust Analysis, 29 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 635, 638-40 (1996) (rejecting theory modem accreditation process is needed
to uphold minimum education standards).
10 See Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on the Law School Accreditation Process, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 379, 383 (1995) (discussing ABA's accreditation process and its effect on the
cost of law school). See generally A'Leia Robinson Henry, Inequality: Plessy v. Ferguson and the
Dilemma of Black Access to Public and Higher Education, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 47 (1998) (discussing
accreditation process' contribution to economic obstacles many African-Americans face in
attaining law degree).
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preparing students intensively for currently under-served, or niche,
markets that are now given short shrift in most law school curricula.
II. HOW THE CARTEL TRIES TO JUSTIFY ITS RENT-SEEKING ACTIVITIES.
To the rare extent the defenders of the status-quo ever address the
larger societal consequences of the accreditation system, they seem
to argue that the present system ideally blends, on the one hand, the
minimal market barriers needed to assure that law school graduates
are prepared adequately to serve the public, with, on the other
hand, the freedom to allow law schools to compete to attract the best
students, the best teachers and the best scholars as well as the
economic security to enable those scholars to produce the important
social good of legal scholarship.11 ABA accreditation has also been
defended on the ground that it provides law school applicants and
employers with useful information in making choices about law
schools and their graduates.12 On the cost side, the status-quo is
defended as a virtual null factor on the ground that without it law
students would still opt to attend equally costly law schools because
they prefer their amenities, their more learned approach to law
teaching and the better opportunities they afford for good jobs.13 In
the final analysis, however, the justification for the ABA's restriction
on entry to the legal education market must rise or fall on its
effectiveness in fulfilling its dual role of assuring, first, that at the
bottom end of the legal education market, students are not exploited
by schools without the resources, skill, or will to provide minimally
competent instruction and, second, that the public is not exploited
by such schools' incompetent graduates. There is, of course, some
truth in all of these various defenses of the status quo in legal
education. However, when they are measured against the realities of
the actual operation of the ABA accreditation process, it becomes
clear that they do not come close to off-setting the costs that the
ABA cartel's rent-seeking activities inflict on the greater society.
11 See George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraint? ABA Accreditation
and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2114 (1998) (discussing goals of ABA in
instituting accreditation process).
12 See Abbie Willard Thorner, Education in the Recruitnent Marketplace: Decades of Change,
1987 DUKE L.J. 276 (1987) (discussing value of graduate's law school in hiring process).
13 See Peter V. Lestou, Law, Education and Legal Education: The Future of Legal Education, 50
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 457 (1999) (estimating full cost of ABA accreditation at one million
dollars).
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A. The argument that ABA accreditation is needed to protect the public
from inadequately prepared law graduates.
This argument, the one on which the legitimacy of the entire
process depends, sounds plausible, but it does not withstand
scrutiny in light of how the ABA accreditation process actually
operates. The starting place for such scrutiny is, of course, the anti-
trust consent decree forbidding the ABA from continuing certain
anti-competitive accreditation practices, such as setting minimum
salary levels for law faculty. 14
ABA insiders tend to view this anti-trust episode as a misguided
government intrusion into private educational decision-making and
as an aberration that is irrelevant to the vast majority of
accreditation practices. To the contrary, if the U.S. Departments of
Justice and Education were to give serious scrutiny to how the entire
accreditation process operates to restrict market entry, they would
conclude that the major restrictions on such entry have as little
demonstrable educational justification as the minimum faculty
salary requirements had. What most of those restrictions do is
impose costly input requirements that have never been, and, I
submit, cannot be, validated as necessary for the effective
preparation of students for the practice of law. The most notorious
of the unvalidated input requirements are those relating to
buildings and libraries.15 Such requirements obviously facilitate
student learning to a degree. It is, however, entirely self-serving,
empirically unsupported and illogical for academics to contend that
they could not effectively prepare their students for practice with
buildings and libraries that are far less expensive than many of
those that have resulted from ABA Accreditation Committee
pressures.
Similarly, the accreditation standards addressed to faculty
members are not intended to assure they have the knowledge and
experience needed to prepare students for law practice.1 6 Instead,
they make it more difficult for schools that would employ a faculty
14 See United States v. ABA, 118 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also STANDARDS FOR
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS, Standard 405(e) (1994) (stating ABA
minimum salary requirements promote competent law faculties).
15 But see Laura N. Gasaway, Academic Law Library Statistics: 1876-1992, 84 LAW LBR. J. 573
(1992) (discussing important effect ABA requirements have on law libraries). .
16 See John D. Copeland, Getting Tossed from the Ivory Tower: The Legal Inplications of
Evaluating Faculty Performance, 61 Mo. L. REV. 233 (1996) (comparing methods of evaluating
law school faculty).
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that concentrates on preparing students for practice.1 7 Thus,
standards that require a form of tenure [Standard 405], a significant
degree of faculty governance [Standards 206, 207, 402(a)(3), and (c)],
scholarship production [Standards 401(a), 402(a)(3), 402(c), and
404(a)(2)] and a high degree of competence in scholarly research and
writing [Standard 401(a)] obstruct schools' ability to hire and
maintain a faculty dedicated only to preparing students for
practice.18
While overloading input requirements, the standards almost
entirely neglect the sort of output measures that could assure that
schools meaningfully address their students' needs for professional
preparation. One would assume that if accreditation were seriously
concerned with assuring that law schools adequately prepare their
students for the initial challenges of practice, they would at a
minimum require a methodical evaluation of the effectiveness of
law school teaching. Yet, the evaluation of teaching is entirely
unsystematic, entailing only cursory classroom visits and no
analysis of what teachers' curricular goals are nor how effectively
they achieve those goals.
Indeed, the one standard that explicitly deals with the evaluation
of student learning demonstrates just how unconcerned the
accreditation process is with preparation for law practice. Requiring
that "the scholastic achievements of students [be] evaluated from
the beginning of the students' studies," Standard 303(b) treats
school achievement as an end in itself rather than as a means for
students to gain the sort of practice-based knowledge and ability
which is needed to be ready to take on the challenges of a real-world
profession.19
17 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Clinical Legal Education and the U.C. Davis Immigration
Law Clinic: Putting Theory into Practice and Practice into Theory, 51 SMU L. REV. 1423, 1424
(1998) (discussing benefits of practical experience over pure classroom learning); Gary Laser,
Significant Curricular Developments: The MacRate Report and Beyond, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 425, 426-
29 (1994) (stating practical experience is important in developing meaningful law school
education); Suellyn Scarnecchia, The Role of Clinical Programs in Legal Education, 77 MICH. B.J.
674 (1998) (discussing emergence of classes giving students practical experience).
18 See generally Paul D. Carrington, Tanking the Rankings: Grading Law Schools by
Conventional Measurements Is More Than Shallow: Its Pernicious, AM. LAW., Apr. 2000, at 39
(discussing factors considered when ranking law schools); Ken Myers, Survey Ranks
Scholarship Output as Critics Say Aim Is Too Narrow, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15 1996, at A15 (discussing
relationship between scholarly output and prestige).
19 See generally Mary Smith Judd, Schools, Bar Wrestle with Preparing Grads for Practice
Whose Role Is It?, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 1996, at 14 (comparing roles of law school and bar
association in educating law students); Law School's Motto: Be Unprepared, PALM BEACH DAILY
BuS. REV., Jan. 15, 1999, at C1 (discussing flaws in Socratic method); Susan Skiles, Many Recent
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Standard 302(a)(1), which requires schools to offer a "core
curriculum," 20 is similarly emblematic of ABA accreditation's failure
to take seriously students' interests in preparation for the challenges
they will face in practice. The term "core curriculum" is undefined. 21
I suppose the accreditation committee 'knows it when it sees it,' as,
in fact, virtually all law teachers and law graduates do. That
unchanging, unstudied recognition is symptomatic of the problem.
The curricular categories that are "core" derive in part from the
ancient forms of action, in part from long-discredited, nineteenth
century Langdelian pseudo-scientific conception of law 22 and,
mostly, from the needs of case book publishers and writers to have a
stable subject matter that need not be continually revised and
complicated by the needs of modem law practice. The extent to
which the "core" courses, which usually means the coverage of the
major casebooks, relate to what law students need to know and do
in order to become competent, ethical legal practitioners is highly
problematic since preparation for practice is seldom the organizing
goal of the casebooks. The traditional first year property course is,
perhaps, the quintessential example of how far the "core" often is
from the types of courses law schools would be offering had they
actually to compete in an open market on the basis of how well they
prepare their students for the challenges they will face in practice.
There is not time to detail what an accreditation process might
look like were it serious about its mission of protecting the public's
interest in competently prepared lawyers. Suffice it to say that, at
the very least, such a process would require law schools to
demonstrate through a variety of measures, including outcome
assessments, that their curricula are rationally planned, periodically
updated and consistently taught in order to provide students with
what they need to know and to be able to do in order to perform
Grads Say Law School Doesn't Teach Right Stuff, CHI. DAILY L BULL., Aug. 9, 1991, at 2 (stating
law school may be leaving law students unprepared for post-graduation).
20 See, e.g., Laser, supra note 17, at 429 (giving example of core curriculum).
21 See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., It's Time Law Schools Listen to the Profession, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at A23 (discussing differences in types of law schools and how they affect
their core curricula); Klein, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing what core curriculum should be).
22 See generally Edward J. Conry, Meta-Jurispndence: The Epistemology of LawMeta-
Jurisprudence: The Epistemology of Law, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 373 (1996) (discussing way law is taught
today and suggesting how it should be taught in future); Peggy Cooper Davis, A Dialogue
about Socratic Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249 (1997) (discussing Socratic
method and its use in modem teaching practices); Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic
Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REv. 113, 113 (discussing changing teaching practices at Harvard
Law School).
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their initial professional roles competently and ethically.
B. The argument that the higher cost of ABA accredited law schools is
necessary to provide law faculhy with the time and resources to publish
scholarship.
The second pro-accreditation argument is that by insulating
accredited law schools from competition with lower cost, teaching
focused schools, accreditation serves the public interest by allowing
accredited schools to channel their increased revenues into the
production of legal scholarship. 23 I find it hard to believe that very
many of our colleagues actually believe this rationale to be true; it
does not come near to withstanding the kind of scrutiny minimal
scholarly standards require.
First, it is disingenuous as a rationale for restricting market entry.
The Supreme Courts of the States do not restrict entry to the bar to
graduates of accredited law schools because those law schools
produce an approved amount of legal scholarship.24 If accreditation
is to screen schools for adequate production of legal scholarship,
deficient schools should, perhaps, be barred from American
Association of Law Schools', ("AALS"), membership, but not from
graduating students otherwise qualified to take bar examinations.25
Second, the notion that legal scholarship is worth the increased
tuition which substantially funds its production not only lacks any
empirical support, it cannot withstand the test of common sense for
several reasons. Here, I have four different arguments against the
proposition that the production of legal scholarship justifies the
ABA's limitations on entry to the legal education market, but
because of time constraints I can just briefly outline them.
23 See generally Carrington, supra note 18, at 39 (discussing factors taken into consideration
when ranking law schools); Phillip C. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L.
REV. 221 (1988) (discussing legal scholarship and its merits); Myers, supra note 18, at A15
(discussing relationship between scholarly output and prestige).
24 See Diaz v. Florida Bd. of Exam'rs, 252 So. 2d 366, 367-68 (Fla. 1971) (denying
petitioner's request for relief since he failed to produce evidence necessary to sustain his
application to take bar examination); see also Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. Supreme Ct. of Fla.,
705 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1998) (holding law degree must be obtained from accredited law
school). See generally Hale v. Supreme Ct. of Fla., 433 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 1983) (outlining
Florida Supreme Court bar admissions rule).
25 See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 13 (6th ed. 1991) (defining "accredited" to mean law
school has been given "official authorization or status" and has been recognized having
"sufficient academic standards to qualify graduates for higher education or for professional
practice"); see also Bennett, supra note 10, at 382 (discussing Association of American Law
Schools accreditation requirements).
[Vol. 15:269
PRIVILEGES OF LEGAL ACADEMIA: A CASE STUDY
First, most legal scholarship is consciously directed to other
academics, rather than policymakers or voters, and it is a
commonplace that few articles are read by more than a few
academics. Second, if legal scholarship were to be justified by its
public benefit, we would expect the degree of such benefit to be a
significant criterion in how academics judge the worth of their
colleagues' legal scholarship. Yet, in hiring and promotion
decisions, it would seem naive, odd, or too political to suggest such
a criterion as a measure of the merits of a scholar's output.
Third, even if one were to infer primarily from the fact of judicial
citations that legal scholarship does play a role in shaping legal
decision making, there is no basis for concluding that it is either an
important or a benign influence. Here the arguments are both
empirical and epistemological and there really isn't time to do them
justice. As the sorry history of academia in Nazi Germany well
illustrates, however, scholarly credentials are no guarantee of
enlightened decision-making on issues of distributive justice or on
matters of moral principle in general; indeed, it would be
profoundly anti-democratic to suggest otherwise.26 Since the point
of the great majority of law review articles is to urge prescriptive
solutions to morally problematic social issues, there is no principled
basis for privileging legal scholarship over the campaign rhetoric of
politicians. The difference, of course, is that citizens have a choice as
to whether or not to contribute to and vote for politicians; law
students wishing to take the bar have no choice but to contribute
much of their tuition to their faculty's scholarship production.
Fourth, in light of modern epistemology's invalidation of any
objective basis for judging the intrinsic value of prescriptive
scholarship, it is legitimate to look to the market for at least some
indication of such scholarship's utility from the point of view of its
potential users. In this regard, I suggest a thought experiment:
assume law faculty are to be compensated for the time they spend
producing legal scholarship only from the revenues paid by those
26 See Myers, supra note 18, at A15 (criticizing legal education, Judge Richard A. Posner
said legal education is "falsely prosperous seeming by virtue of eating crumbs from the table
of the nation's wealthiest profession"); see also John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship,
or if the Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 343, 346 (1989)
(arguing law school education neglects some necessary lawyer competencies); Ronald H.
Silverman, Weak Law Teaching, Adam Smith and a New Model of Merit Pay, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 267, 299 (2000) (citing Paul Savoy argument legal education and law teachers
discourages "creativity by humiliation and criticism").
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willing to purchase or fund such scholarship. How much
scholarship would then be produced? To ask the question is to
answer it. Just as several universities have closed down their
sociology departments because no one wanted to buy or subsidize
the information they were producing, so the bulk of the legal
scholarship industry would dry up for lack of a market for its
product.
C. The argument that ABA accreditation does not significantly increase the
cost of legal education.
It might be argued that even if the increased costs resulting from
ABA accreditation cannot be justified by public need, elimination of
the governmental privileging of accreditation would not in fact
lower the cost of legal education. Prospective students, it is argued,
would still opt for the pricier schools because, given a choice
between low cost unaccredited and high cost ABA accredited law
schools, both of which would allow entry to the bar, most law
students would choose the high cost alternatives because of their
superior teaching, superior amenities, and most important, their
opportunities for securing better jobs. This is a dubious argument.
No doubt there would be a significant lag time before the
advantages of some of the unaccredited schools became known and
their prospective students could gain confidence that they would
not be disadvantaged in the pursuit of employment.
Over time, however, there would seem little doubt that very
strong law school applicants already saddled with heavy college
debt would prefer some of the lower cost unaccredited schools,
especially in light of the fact that the teachers at such schools would
be required to focus all of their attention and effort on preparing
them for the challenges they will face in practice. Once employers
realized that equally bright students who were better prepared for
the initial challenges of practice could be found at the cheaper
unaccredited schools, market pressure would compel the ABA
accredited schools to compete for such students through reducing
the differential in both cost and the attention their faculty members
pay to preparing students for practice.
[Vol. 15:269
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D. The argument that ABA accreditation provides students and employers
with information needed to make informed choices among law schools.
The initial fallacy in this argument is that law schools, at least
those not subject to governmental disclosure requirements, can
choose to keep secret all of the findings that form the basis for
accreditation decisions.27 Accreditation is, therefore, virtually
useless to anyone who would like to have information for purposes
of comparative shopping among accredited law schools. The goal of
providing consumer information and of, thereby, supporting a more
competitive market for legal education, could, thus, be far better
achieved through a voluntary certification program that would not
permit schools to conceal critical information.28 By freeing the
informational goals of accreditation from governmental restrictions
on the admission to practice, certification would avoid the
paternalism and anti-competitiveness inherent in the present
system. By directing its efforts specifically to the collection and
dissemination of consumer relevant information, it could also avoid
some of the conflict of interest that is now inherent in a system in
which most of the inspectors who would have to reveal unfavorable
information about the programs they inspect are themselves
academics subject to the same risk of unfavorable publicity when
their own schools are inspected.29
III. THE EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING THE ABA's ACCREDITATION
MONOPOLY
My analysis thus far leads to the following conclusions. By
making the market for legal education more competitive through
abolishing the near monopoly ABA accredited schools have on
graduating students eligible for the bar, the public would be
advantaged by lower cost legal services and better trained lawyers
27 See Main Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 40 AM. U.
L. REv. 367,404-5 (1990) (noting difficulties with peer evaluation of law school faculty).
28 The American Bar Association's Role in the Law School Accreditation Process, at
http://www.abanet.org (stating accreditation process requires each law school to file a
detailed questionnaire); see also Bennett, supra note 10, at 379 (stating reason behind
accreditation process is to maintain minimum standards of instructional competence). But see
Florida Bd. of Bar Exain'rs, 705 So. 2d at 899 (stating accreditation process ensures uniform
standards throughout U.S.).
See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2128 (1998) (explaining process for gaining and
retaining accreditation creates obstacle to admission since it is time consuming and
expensive).
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while law students would be advantaged by being better prepared
for practice and by having to pay substantially less in tuition.
It is true that the public and prospective law students would be
subjected to a somewhat greater risk that unaccredited law schools
would provide substandard legal education. However, as already
noted, because the present law school accreditation system does not
effectively monitor for educational effectiveness, this risk would not
likely outweigh the countervailing disadvantages of the present
paternalistic regime, which, as noted, denies consumers and
students the right to make their own benefit-risk calculus as to the
expensiveness of the legal services or legal education that would
best suits their individual needs.30 As to the familiar argument that
consumers and prospective law students do not have the knowledge
and sophistication to make such determinations, a voluntary
certification process could supply far more information than the
present accreditation system which gives the public no qualitative
distinctions to differentiate among the accredited schools.31 Of
course, were ABA accreditation effectively to monitor for and report
on the comparative degrees to which accredited law schools actually
prepared their students for the challenges they are likely to meet in
practice, this calculus would likely be quite different.
While benefiting law students and the public, abolishing the
mandatory ABA accreditation system would make lawyers as a
class financially less well off since the influx into practice of many
more lawyers, including many with smaller investments in their
legal education, would lower the cost of legal services generally,
and, therefore, reduce the incomes of lawyers. 32 In addition, law
faculty would also be less well off since competitive pressures
would lower tuition revenues to a point where they could be
30 See Bennett, supra note 10, at 380 (stating accreditation process does not confine itself to
ensuring uniform standards); see also John S. Elson, The Regulation of Legal Education: The
Potential for hnplementing the MacCrate Report's Recommendation of Curricular Reform, 1 CLINICAL
REv. 363, 370 (1994) (explaining challenge facing law schools is preparing students for legal
practice).
31 See Myers, supra note 18, at A15 (reporting ABA task force recommends giving
prospective law students more information, at earlier stage, about legal profession). But see
Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re: Mass. School of Law, 705 So. 2d at 899 (acknowledging ABA's
criticism but pointing out ABA is best equipped for evaluating quality of education).
32 See Denise Rothbardt, ABA Accreditation: Educational Standards and Its Focus on Output
Requirements, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 461, 468 (1999) (discussing MSL allegation ABA
accreditation standards restrict competition in law school market); see also Shepherd &
Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2135 (stating ABA accreditation standards only benefit law
school's faculty while law students have to bear cost).
[Vol. 15:269
PRIVILEGES OF LEGAL ACADEMIA: A CASE STUDY
compensated primarily for the effectiveness of their teaching.33
IV. WHY THE PUBLIC CONTINUES TO ALLOW THE ABA TO INCREASE
THE COSTS AND REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AMERICAN LEGAL
EDUCATION.
Although the public injury caused by cartel rent-seeking activity
has long been a favorite subject of economics-minded legal
scholars,34 the successful rent-seeking of the legal academy has
escaped the public scrutiny of all but a few academics, 35 even after
the Justice Department's anti-trust suit.36 Although this neglect is, as
noted, understandable in light of legal academics' economic self-
interest, an important question, nevertheless, arises as to why there
appears to be no significant ongoing pressure from government at
any level to remedy the continuing anti-competitive effects of the
accreditation process in light of the Government's anti-trust suit, the
abundance of evidence of ABA accreditation's cartel-like rent-
seeking activity and that activity's enormous impact on those who
cannot now afford either legal education or legal services. 37
33 See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2135-36 (discussing how ABA accreditation
requires law schools to pay faculty more than necessary to retain them); Portinga, supra note 9,
at 661-62 (1996) (discussing how ABA accreditation restriction on teaching hours increases
professors' pay above market value). See generally Ronald H. Silverman, Weak Law Teaching,
Adam Smith and a New Model of Merit Pay, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267, 268-69 (2000)
(considering effects of allowing students to directly influence compensation of law professors
with merit based pay system in effort to deal with monopoly of law professors).
34 See William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in
the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 619 (1987) (discussing issue of proper
judicial response to problem of rent seeking by interest groups in political process, and noting
it is subject of recent legal scholarship). See generally Mark Glick, Is Monopoly Rent Seeking
Compatible with Wealth Maximization? 1994 BYU L REV. 499, 499 (1994) (stating market based
rent seeking activities of monopolies do not create social costs and questioning need for
expensive antitrust enforcement); Barry E. Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982
Acts: The Continuing Need for Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 201 (1982) (exemplifying
legal scholarship concern with antitrust issues); Robert W. McGee & Yeomin Yoon, Trade
Policy in the Computer Industry: Time for a Change, 8 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 219, 231 (1994)(noting Japanese formed cartel to monitor computer chip prices in response to pressure from
United States).
35 See Harry First, Competition in the Legal Industry II: An Antitrust Amalysis, 54 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1049, 1049 (1979) (outlining history of ABA accreditation and applying antitrust
analysis); Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2095-96 (noting other papers have
addressed ABA accreditation issues, yet have not considered economic analysis of ABA
accreditation as cartel participating in successful rent-seeking activity); Portinga, supra note 9,
at 635 (applying antitrust analysis to ABA accreditation).
36 See Rothbardt, supra note 32, at 461 acknowledging ABA's great market power and
discussing its effects on Massachusetts School of Law); Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at
2091 (discussing ABA accreditation as cartel); see also Portinga, supra note 9, at 635 (applying
antitrust analysis to ABA accreditation).
37 See Rothbardt, supra note 32, at 463, 476 (discussing financial constraints put on law
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There are, of course, reasons why the public tolerates cartel rent-
seeking behavior that apply to the ABA as they would to any trade
group.38 The chain of causation between the ABA's rent-seeking and
the resultant economic losses to the public is difficult for members
of the public to identify.39 Equally important, the public has far less
incentive to fight the rent-seeking than cartel members have to
maintain it because the costs of the restrictions on competition in
legal services are diffused across the general public.40
In this regard, respect of a sort is due the leaders of the cartel,
mostly a segment of deans and former deans who dominate the
ABA Section of Legal Education, for their skill in employing classic
cartel strategies in order to ensure their governmental protection is
not threatened. This has entailed basically a threefold strategy to
assure, first, that judges and bar officials buy into their accreditation
program, second, that other law schools do not defect from that
program and, third, that meaningful dissent within the ABA
generally and the Section of Legal Education in particular is
neutralized. 41 Unfortunately, this cannot be the occasion to relate a
students as result of ABA accreditation requirements); Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at
2096-97 (noting power of ABA is enhanced by government enforcement of its rules and ABA
accreditation rules have denied access of lower income persons to legal services and
profession). See generally Mathew A. Finkin, 7e Unfolding Tendency in the Federal Relationship to
Private Accreditation in Higher Education, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 89 (1994) (outlining
relationship between federal government and private accrediting agencies).
38 See Finkin, supra note 37, at 90 (stating accreditation of higher education developed to
provide structure and set standards for education); Rothbardt, supra note 32, at 482 (stating
standards set by trade associations can be helpful, reliable standards upon which consumers
can depend); She pherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2211 (noting ABA accreditation may
increase quality of lawyers).
39 See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2105-06 (discussing how ABA accreditation
requirements affect legal services market and create economic loss to public); Portinga, supra
note 9, at 657 (stating accreditation increases costs of education, restricts output, and can
enforce monopolies in other markets). See generally First, supra note 35, at 1098 (explaining
economic repercussions of suppressing "non-elite" law schools).
40 See Christoher T. Cunniffe, T7w Case for the Alternative Third-Year Program, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 85, 101-02 (1997) (stating costs to society of legal education is borne by students, families,
private donors, law schools, governments, and taxpayers); Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note
11, at 2096 (explaining ABA cartel system has impacted different legal markets and outlining
how markets deal with resulting higher costs); Portinga, supra note 9, at 657 (stating
accreditation increases costs of education, restricts output, and can promote monopolies in
other markets).
41 See Cunniffe, supra note 40, at 137 (noting reform over regulation of legal education
seems less likely to be implemented by judiciary when considering judiciaries are influenced
by lawyers or potential former legal educators); Elson, supra note 26, at 372-74 (noting power
of law school deans and their general defense of regulatory status quo); Shepherd &
Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2257 (noting prospects for reform are "dim" because of law faculty
capturing ABA committees). But see Portinga, supra note 9, at 637 (noting letter written by
fourteen law school deans to all ABA accredited law schools calling for accreditation process
to be reformed).
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plethora of anecdotes from my own and others' experiences with
ABA accreditation to illustrate how effectively the Section
leadership has used each of these strategies, although I must say
that their latest maneuver to divest the ABA House of Delegates of
any decision making authority over accreditation matters, 42 contrary
to the ABA's own Constitution,43 is an excellent example of such
effectiveness.
Finally, the ABA has successfully behaved in the tradition of
cartels that have sought to gain legitimacy through the use of
mythic images, such as "the family farm"44 or the "scholar
athlete,"45 in order to convince the public that the cartel's
immunities from competition are justified in order to protect the
public from harm, or to preserve some fundamental shared moral
values or to provide a remedy for or a deterrent against some past
or impending injustice.46 The public's failure to identify the rent-
seeking activity of accredited law schools as a typical trade group
rent-seeking operation, I believe draws upon the myth in our society
of the law professor as a public intellectual who speaks with the
objective authority of the law.47 It is understandably difficult for
42 See generally American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar:
Standards for Approval of Law Schools, 84 A.B.A. J. 121 (stating process of accreditation is
decision of Accreditation Committee, Council, and House of Delegates); Steven Keeva, Will
Top Profs Who Instruct via Internet Dominate Teaching? 83 A.B.A. J. 18 (1997); Robert A. Stein,
Ensuring High Quality Education, 82 A.B.A. J. 96 (stating accreditation committee is comprised
of lawyers, professors and public members of ABA, and not solely members of ABA's House
of Delegates).
43 See RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS BY THE ABA, R. 11 (1994)
(stating House of Delegates governs ABA's policy making); Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note
11, at 2095 (stating House of Delegates has ultimate authority in which schools are awarded
accreditation).
44 See Richard L. Abel, The Future of the Legal Profession: Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 737, 752 (1994) (analogizing efforts of ABA shielding legal profession from
outside competition with futile attempts to protect family farm from intrusion of global
agribusiness). See generally Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 222 (1998)
(discussing American family farm and its connotation).
4-5 See Timothy Davis, Sports Law as a Reflection of Society's Laws and Values: Balancing
Freedom of Contract and Competing Values in Sports, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 1115, 1140-41 (199)
(discussing ideology of amateurism and scholar athlete with antitrust laws). See generally Law
v. NAACP, 902 F. Supp. 1394, 1408 (D. Kan. 1995) (discussing claim against NCAA for
antitrust violations, and how it affected student-athletes); Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA,
Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2644-45 (1996) (discussing REC
regulation which sought to protect scholar athlete).
46 See Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1993)
(discussing history of monopoly in law and how it has been perceived at times advantageous
and harmful to public); Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2095 (stating ABA's
accreditation system is monopoly). But see Henry Ramsey Jr., The Histony, Organization, and
Accomplishments of the American Bar Association Accreditation Process, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
267 (1995) (discussing many positive effects of ABA accreditation process on legal profession).
47 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
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those who are not actually familiar with law professors and their
deans to separate this powerful image from their role as
economically self-interested agents acting to protect their own
incomes and perqs.
There is also an argument to be made that legal scholars' long-
standing failure to expose and critique the ABA's rent-seeking
behavior in itself demonstrates the power of the rent-seeking
dynamic to subordinate legal academics' mythic role as public
intellectual to their group economic self-interest. It seems unlikely
that economics-minded legal academics actually believe the ABA's
rent-seeking behavior is consistent with the free market philosophy
that is so pervasive among legal scholars.48 They cannot be so
narcissistic as to actually believe that their premium academic
salaries, 49 their comparatively plush physical facilities, their
comparatively lax tenure requirements50 and their comparatively
light and loosely evaluated teaching demands, 51 are due to their
own virtues as academics rather than to the fact that they hold the
keys to their students' entry into a lucrative profession. Given the
pride many legal academics take in puncturing the hidden rent-
ECoN. REV. 941 (1963) (noting professionals receive level of trust from public, creating
opportunity for abuse); Posner, supra note 46, at 1 (stating, on average, attorneys are brighter
than general public); see also Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2095 (describing
misconception that ABA's system of accreditation has caused unfairness).
48 See Portinga, supra note 9, at 638-39, 644 (discussing U.S. Justice Department's lawsuit
against ABA for antitrust violations); see also Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2097. See
generally Rudolph C. Hasl, Legal Education and Accreditation, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1996, at 2
(discussing how ABA's accreditation system has been criticized for antitrust violations and
has had adverse impact on legal profession).
49 See Portinga, supra note 9, at 657-58 (stating ABA accreditation standard is almost price-
fixing); see also Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2135 (describing three ways in which
ABA s accreditation system increases compensation of law faculty, one of those ways being
direct increase of faculty salaries); Daniel Wise, ABA to Alter Accreditation Process: Federal Civil
Antitrust Complaint Settled, N.Y. L.J., June 1995, at 1 (discussing ABA's practice of measuring
professor salaries by regional standards).
50 See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 2135, 2140-41 (discussing decrease of
professor workloads and expectations due to ABA accreditation system). See generally Richard
C. Reuben, An Alternative Law School Sues ABA Massachusetts Dean Challenges Association's
"Monopoly Power" in Accreditation, 80 A.B.A. J. 25 (discussing how "cartel" created by ABA has
increased salaries and decreased workload of law professors).
51 See George C. Christie, Legal Education in an Era of Change: Th7e Recmitment of Law
Faculty, 1987 DuKE L.J. 306, 314 (1987) (discussing need to keep law professors' load to
minimum); Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 40 AM.
U. L. REv. 367, 400 (1990) (illustrating several reasons why it is difficult to evaluate
effectiveness of law professor's teaching). See generally Daniel Gordon, Does Law Teaching Have
Meaning? Teaching Effectiveness? Gauging Alumni Competence, and the MacCrate Report, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 43 (1997) (discussing ineffectiveness of law school professor evaluation
methods).
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seeking behavior of various segments of the American economy,5 2
their relative silence as to the nature and consequences of their own
group rent-seeking can be understood only as a natural desire not to
jeopardize their own and their colleagues' economic well-being.
That legal academics behave as members of any rent-seeking cartel
should not be surprising. Recognition of that fact, however, should
also entail recognition that they deserve, as a class, no more
deference than any trade group seeking special government
protection against free market competition.5 3
V. THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF THE ABA's RENT-SEEKING
ACCREDITATION BEHAVIOR
There is, however, one critical difference between the rent-seeking
conduct of legal academia and that of typical industry trade groups.
To illustrate, if enough members of the public no longer believe that
the public myth of the need to preserve the family dairy farm in
non-Midwestern states justifies the higher milk prices, resulting
from the federal law which sets minimum milk prices as a function
of distance from Eau Claire, Wisconsin, they can support legislators
who will vote against such supports.54
The same cannot be said in regard to the public's right to opt for
lower costs in legal education and legal services by rejecting law
school accreditation restrictions. Should the public no longer
believe they are needed in order to subsidize legal scholarships or to
graduate adequately prepared lawyers? Under their constitutional
power to regulate admission to law practice, the State Supreme
Courts, at least those of 45 States, have delegated this authority to
the ABA Section of Legal Education.SS Although in many States,
52 See Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill the Economists: An Empirical
Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political System, 70 TEX. L.
REv. 645, 649 (1992) (stating lawyers engage in nonproductive, redistributive rent-seeking
behavior); Jonathan R. Macey, Chicken Wars as Prisoners Dilemma: What's in a Game?, 64 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 447, 447 (1989). See generally Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Interface of
Trade/Competition Law & Policy: An Economist's Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 439 (1987) (giving
recent examples of rent seeking).
53 See Cross, supra note 52, at 664-65.
54 See Matthew L. Spitzer, Perspective on Direct Democracy: Evaluating Direct Democracy: A
Response, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 37,42 (1997) (stating democracy has some advantages
when voters can choose policies by voting for legislators). Bit see Robert D. Tollison,
Symposiumn on the Theory of Public Choice: Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339, 350
(1988) (indicating elected representatives sometimes vote according to their own personal
value judgments as opposed to their constituents' interests).
55 See Dykstra, supra note 8, at 290 (1995) (noting current accreditation standards were
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Supreme Court judges are periodically elected,5 6 judicial elections
are clearly not meaningful mechanisms for holding justices
accountable for their ratification of ABA law school accreditation
standards. Such elections are too few and far between and the issues
too far embedded in technical detail to expect such elections to
become a meaningful referendum on law school accreditation
decisions.
Equally important, it will be difficult to disentangle the public
image of the Court as an entity that should be trusted to exercise its
independent legal expertise in its adjudicative role from that of its
role as the regulator of the legal profession.5 7 In the latter capacity,
contrary to public expectations of the justices' independence and
expertise, courts as an institutional matter do not possess the
knowledge, the independence, the resources and the motivation to
adequately protect the public interest.58
There is no question that because the State Supreme Courts do not
presently have the resources to evaluate even a small fraction of the
law schools that graduate applicants to their respective bars, the
Courts must as a practical matter rely on a national accreditation
body like the ABA.
The Justices I suspect are not only reluctant to evaluate the
implemented in 1970's and 49 jurisdictions immediately took part); Portinga, supra note 9, at
636 (stating 45 states require applicant to bar to have graduated from ABA accredited law
school). But see Rothbardt, supra note 32, at 462 (indicating only 41 states rely on ABA
accredited schools in determining who can sit for bar).
56 See Kurt M. Brauer, The Role of Campaign Fundraising in Michigan Supreme Court
Elections: Should We Throw the Baby out with the Batrwater?, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 367, 368 (1998)
(stating Michigan's constitution mandatesthat supreme court justices be elected); Brenda
Wright, The Bench and the Ballot: Applying the Protections of the Voting Rights Act to Judicial
Elections, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 670 (1992) (indicating Florida used at-large voting process
for electing state judges since 1984). See generally Robert L. Brown, From Whence Cometh Our
Appellate Judges: Popular Election Versus the Missouri Plan, 20 U. ARK. LITrLE RocK L.J. 313
(1998) (discussing which states provide for election of judges).
57 See Ippolito v. Florida, 824 F. Supp. 1562, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (caiming judiciary's
encroachment on Florida bar's legislative function implicates constitutional doctrine
mandating separation of powers and asserting that Florida Supreme Court lacks inherent
power to regulate its own members); Robert B. McKay, Law, Lawyers and the Public Interest, 55U. GiN. L REv. 351, 365 (1985) ( tating self-regulation of legal profession continues to be
dominated by self interest often at expense of public interest). But see Board of Commr's of
State Bar v. Peterson, 937 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Utah 1997) (claiming Utah supreme court has
exclusive authority to regulate practice of law).
58 See John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation: Learning from the Ohio
Struggle to Reform Its Discipline System, 684 CIN. L. REV. 65, 85-91 (1999) (noting Ohio court
system lacks will and resources to carry out disciplinary measures); see also William T.
gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar,
22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 563 (1995) (discussing lawyers natural tendency to protect his own kind
rather than the public interest).
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adequacy of the ABA as their surrogate evaluator because of their
lack of resources, but also, because they recognize the practical
problems that would result if each State Supreme Court were to
impose its independent evaluative criteria on the ABA's national
accreditation efforts.
An equal, if not more important, disincentive against State
Supreme Courts' assumption of a meaningful role in assuring that
law school accreditation serves the public interest, instead of the
self-interest of legal academia, is that it simply is not in the interest
of the justices to reduce barriers to entry to the practice of law and,
thereby, increase competition among lawyers, and, thereby, reduce
individual lawyer's earnings. 59 The reasons are both economic and
cultural.60
Judges' salaries are set in relation to the earnings of competent
lawyers; when the differential becomes too great, legislators usually
agree that the need for a competent judiciary requires an increase in
judges' pay. Many judges also retire to carry on prestigious law
practices, the prospective value of which would decrease with
increased competition among lawyers.
There are also work-related reasons why Supreme Court judges
might fear increased competition among lawyers, including
overloading the court system as a result of the increased litigation
that would result from the representation of more low income
people. In addition, the prospect of more lawyers in practice, as well
as that of increased competition among lawyers, would be perceived
as potentially increasing the already over-stressed workload of most
Courts' disciplinary agencies.61 Finally, as a cultural matter, judges
usually share with the organized bar a self image of their profession
59 See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Finn Structure, 84 VA. L. REv.
1707, 1745-51 (1998) (discussing role of judges in preserving bar's special "guild" status
through legal ethics which helps maintain or even increase lawyers salaries); see also
Gallagher, supra note 58 (noting lawyers training and socialization have inculcated shared
sense of professional community leading to purposeful protection of other lawyers interests).
60 See Marvin L. Karp, Some Reflections on Change -And Professionalism, 24 BRIEF 9 (1995)
(stating legal profession has changed from atmosphere of trust to one driven by competition
and economic pressure); Martha Middleton, Legal Scholarship: Is it Relevant?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 9,
1989, at I (discussing importance of scholarship to careers of young academics).
61 See Karp, supra note 60, at 11 (noting animosities between counsel inhibit resolutions to
conflicts contributing to increased lawsuits clogging courts); Doug Abrahms, Three FCC
Nominies Clear First Hurdle to Confinnation, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at B9 (noting
competition between lawyers has dogged court dockets). But see Andy Dabilis, Mediation
Lacks Unifonn Standards, B. GLOBE, Oct. 30, 1994, at 1 (suggesting Alternative Dispute
Resolution could reduce competition between lawyers and unclog court systems).
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as more exclusive and more intellectual than typical trades. 62
Law school accreditation requirements that promote faculty
scholarship and impose costs that exclude those who are not willing
or not able to make a substantial financial commitment to their
preparation for the bar supports this aristocratic self-image and
natural conservatism as to the legal order which judges and lawyers
share and have shared since the early years of the Republic, as De
Toqueville so perceptively noted.63
Thus, given that the rent-seeking of legal academia is not subject
to the normal democratic checks on other cartels' rent-seeking
activities and that the public is seriously harmed by academia's rent-
seeking through its increase in the costs of legal education and legal
services and its decrease in their effectiveness, I suggest that there is
a need for some innovative strategy to seek fundamental reform of
the law school accreditation system.
VI. ONE AVENUE TOWARDS REFORM
For reasons I have discussed, such reform cannot be expected to
come from State Supreme Courts or the ABA, although a revitalized
House of Delegates might become a more potent force for
improving the effectiveness, although not the costliness, of legal
education.64
62 See Neil K. Komesar, Slow Learning in Constitutional Analysis, 88 Nw. U.L REV. 21Z 213
(1993) (stating judges are arrogant and consider themselves heroic figures); see also Marcia
Coyle, Ad Decision Could Spur A Rollback, NAT'L L.J., July 3, 1995, at Al (noting lawyers and
judges have strong emotions about their own self-image and image of legal profession);
Charles Fried, The Trouble with Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1984 (suggesting judges cannot
remain immune to attitudes and self-image of lawyers who plead cases before them).
63 Where lawyers are absolutely needed, as in England and the United States, and their
professional knowledge is held in high esteem, they become increasingly separated from
the people, forming a class apart.... (T)he lawyers from the political upper class are the
most intellectual section of society. Consequently they only stand to lose from any
innovation; this adds an interest in conservation to their natural taste for order .... The
judge is a lawyer who, apart from the taste for order and for rules imparted by his legal
studies, is given a liking for stability by the permanence of his own tenure of office. His
knowledge of the law in itself has assured him already high social standing among his
equals, and his political power as a judge puts him in a rank apart with all the instincts of
the privileged classes.
DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 246-247; Middleton supra note 60, at 1.
64 See Daniel B. Kennedy, Fire and Brimstone: Legal Educators React to "Conspiracy Theory"
Leveled at Them, 79 A.B.A. J. 96 (1993) (noting in August 1993 ABA House Delegates adopted
recommendation that ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools be amended to require
law schools to maintain educational programs designed to prepare students "to participate
effectively in the legal profession" as well as to qualify them for admission to bar); see also
Chris Klein, Revolution from Above? A Judge Calls for a Two-Year I.D. Program, BAT'L L.J., Oct. 14,
1996 at A12 (stating "[what] a student may gain intellectually, Judge Posner has said, he or she
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State legislatures are a possible source of reform, but the lobbying
power of state bars, state constitutional separation of powers
provisions and the need for a national approach to law school
accreditation make them an unlikely and inefficient vehicles for the
needed reform.
Instead, I suggest that the most likely - and I'll admit, not
politically; not very likely at all - source of meaningful reform is a
federal statute that would prohibit any educational restrictions on
the right to practice law in any State if those restrictions have not
been validated according to professionally recognized methods of
evaluation for the purpose of assuring that the restrictions are in fact
needed in order to prepare lawyers for the competent and ethical
practice of law.65
I think such a proposal would pass constitutional scrutiny for two
reasons: first, restrictions on the ability to practice law have an
obvious, pervasive impact on the national economy 66 and, second,
the State Supreme Courts' entirely passive ratification of the ABA's
accreditation standards demonstrate that federal intrusion into this
area of state regulation would not be considered impermissibly
intrusive on critical matters of state's rights. 67
I doubt that my proposal in this regard will be seriously
considered and debated by mainstream legal academia, but at least I
would hope that those many legal academics who have been in the
loses in the pocketbook"); Ken Myers, ABA Report Says Academia, Bar Need to Bolster Lawyering
Skills, NATL L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 4 (stating ABA "task force recommends giving prospective
law students more information at earlier stage about law schools and about legal profession");
Ken Myers, At Conference, Posner Blasts Academics for Weak Sclolarship, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 1991,
at 4 (stating legal academia is "rightly lacking confidence in its intellectual standards and
quality, it is highly vulnerable to political assaults and seductions").
65 See Klein, supra note 64, at A12 (noting legal profession and public fell educators may
not be producing well-enough trained professionals within three years); Myers, ABA Report
Says Academia, Bar Need to Bolster Lauyering Skills, supra note 64, at 4 (stating skills and values
of competent lawyers develop along continuum starting before law school, reaching its most
formative and intensive stage during law school experience, and continuous throughout
lawyer's professional career); Myers, At Conference, Posner Blasts Academics for Weak
Scholarship, supra note 64, at 4 (stating "legal education has been distorted by state
regulation").
66 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975) (statin "activities of lawyers
play an important part in commercial intercourse"); Roger J. Goebel, The Liberalization of
Interstate Legal Practice in the European Union: Lessons for the United States?, 34 INT'L LAW. 307
(2000) (citing New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985), which states that practice of law is
important to nation's economy).
67 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (holding Congress did not violate federalism
principles when it regulated interstate commerce). But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (holding federal intrusion into state regulation requiring local law enforcement officers
to conduct background checks on proposed handgun transferees unconstitutional).
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forefront of the defense of free market principles and of the attack
on cartel rent-seeking will at least explain how their opposition to
my challenge to ABA accreditation is consistent with the legal
theories they espouse.
VII. POSTSCRIPT
I realize that the question of the long-term viability of the status
quo in legal education is more problematic than my original
pessimistic conclusions indicated. There are, of course, still good
reasons for being pessimistic about the prospects for opening
American legal education to competitive market conditions. As I
have noted, by tying court-controlled bar admissions to ABA
accreditation, the state supreme courts, legal academia and the
organized bar have effectively insulated the legal education cartel
not only from effective market competition, but also from the
democratic reform process. Even if the leaders of the bench, bar and
academia were to be persuaded that the ABA's rent-seeking
accreditation efforts have disserved low income Americans' access
to effective and affordable legal education and legal services,
systemic change would be unlikely. Principles of free market
competition, economic efficiency and equal access to justice are
comforting ideals for professionals to espouse, but they are rarely
sufficient to cause those who have been economically benefited by
their violation to yield their benefits voluntarily.68
What does give some cause for optimism is the fact that the legal
education cartel cannot insulate itself from the general economy.
The competitive markets of an increasingly global economy have
forced an ever-growing number of inefficient, hierarchical
enterprises to streamline their operations by cutting costs and
instituting evaluative measures to promote profit maximization.
68 Cf. Roger C. Cramson, Symposium: The Future of the Legal Profession: Delivery of Legal
Services to Ordinarj Amrericans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 564 (1994) (stating increased
competition within legal profession would lower cost and therefore increase availability of
routine legal services to general public, without reducing quality); Maimon Schwarzchild,
Class, National Character, and the Bar Refonns in Britain: Will There Always Be an England?, 9
CONN. J. INT'L L. 185, 222-223 (1994) (characterizing England under Prime Minister Thatcher
as having free market thinking, viewing traditional legal profession as obstacle to free
competition and thus favoring more efficient practices). But cf, Stephano Agostini, Advertising
and Solicitation: A Comparative Analysis of Why Italian and American Lawyers Approach Their
Profession Differently, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 329, 369 (1996) (contrasting American legal
profession's notions of free market economy and competition with Italy's system of stricter
regulation consisting of severe dignity and honor requirements).
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Our legal education system represents the antithesis of this
movement toward efficient resource utilization, unless, of course,
one views legal scholarship as a primary goal of legal education. 69
Of course, from the perspective of those who pay, it is not: students
do not pay tuition and clients do not pay the fees that make
students' investment in their tuition a worthwhile long-term
investment because either group wants to support the scholarly
enterprise. Rather, they pay the extra amount that subsidizes the
scholarly enterprise because, even after factoring in the toll of
academics' rent-seeking, such payments still appear to be profitable
investments.70
Whether this calculus will be affected by the global economic
trends that are making the competitive survival of all kinds of
enterprises dependent upon more efficient resource utilization
depends upon a variety of rapidly evolving and, therefore, still quite
speculative, economic factors affecting the legal services
marketplace. For example, on the one hand, the recent large
increases in the pay of law firm associates have put pressure on both
the associates and their firms to pay for such increases through
greater productivity. One fall out of this cost increase could be more
pressure on law schools to invest more in teaching and less in
scholarship in order to improve students' preparation for law
practice so that they can become productive more quickly.71 On the
other hand, if the commercial legal services industry continues to
generate the surplus wealth that has enabled it to bear without
69 Cf. Christopher T. Cunnife, The Case for the Alternative Third Year Program, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 85, 102-03 (1997) (recognizing third year of law school is of declining marginal utility to
both law students through increased tuition and in taxpayer's contributions to subsidize
federal loan programs).
70 See Cunnife, supra note 69, at 98 (stating law students invest in law school to buy
"knowledge, and ultimately, a credential, which will then be resold in embodied form and for
a profit to employers over the course of a lifetime," quoting Harry First, Competition in the Legal
Education Industnj (1), 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 315 (1978)); Myers, At Conference, Posner Blasts
Academics for Weak Scholarship, supra note 64, at 4 (quoting Judge Posner, "law schools have a
captive audience, insulating [them] form a true market test of the value of the services they
provide... The students recognize that they are paying for a credential, rather than an
education").
71 See Michael M. Boone & Terry W. Conner, Into the New Millennium: Change, Change, and
More Change: The Challenge Facing Law Finns, 63 TEX. B.J. 18, 22 (2000) (noting changes in law
firm economics after 1970's have increased lawyer salaries and productivity demands in form
of increased billable hour requirements); see also Henry Gesmer, 1000 Words: Changes in
Massechussetts Law Practice - 1936-1996, B. B.J. 4, 5 (1997) (recognizing such increase in
compensation has led to law firm "peer review" of each partner's productivity). But see Vicki
M. Huebner, Increased Starting Salaries: What Have We Wrought on the Profession?, ORANGE CO.
LAW. 32, 32 (2000) (arguing salary increase leads to high degree of associate attrition, leading
to decreased productivity).
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serious complaint the costs that have been appropriated from
student tuition in order to fund legal scholarship, there is unlikely to
be significant added pressure on law schools either to lower their
costs or improve their teaching.72
However, a substantial downturn in the profitability of law
practice could stress the legal education-legal services marketplace
in ways that could substantially restructure how the costs of legal
education are allocated. Such a downturn could occur even if the
general economy were to remain strong, if, for example,
increasingly competitive market pressures were to cause clients to
impose auditing methods that allowed firms' reimbursement only
for the demonstrably productive work of associates or if, through
the growing movement toward multi-disciplinary law practice,
significant amount of traditional associate work were shifted to
cheaper non-lawyers. 73
Whether caused by a general economic downturn or a more
competitive and cost effective legal services marketplace, a
significant reduction in lawyers' income expectations could be
expected to influence prospective law school applicants to apply to
schools that have adapted to the new tighter legal marketplace in
one or both of two ways: first, by lowering tuitions to a point where
legal education would still appear a viable investment in spite of
lawyers' reduced income projections and, second, by providing
through their reputations and educational programs access to jobs
which even under the new, tighter market conditions would project
incomes that would make even high tuition investments appear
worthwhile. While most schools do not have the funds to make a
significant relative difference in their reputations, they could
continue to compete in such a tightened market by means of
72 Cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 953 (2000) (stating "[d]riven by corporate demand, backed by
corporate wealth, the legal system prices itself out of the reach of individuals except those of a
claim wealth"). But see Boone & Conner, supra note 71, at 22 (recognizing maturity in today's
clients mi that they discriminate purchases of legal services, resulting in larger clients dividing
up work among firms, leading to increased pressure on firms to consider legal costs).
73 See Claire Hammer Matturro, Auditing Attorneys' Bills: Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of a
Growing Trend, 73 FLA. B.J. 14, 14, 16-17 (1999) (noting new trend of auditing attorneys' bills by
professional auditors and existence of comprehensive audit system which includes revision of
attorney work product); Darlene Ricker, Auditing Lawyers for a Living, A.B.A. J. 65, 65 (1994)
(noting growing number and demand of legal auditing firms, most of which are insurance
companies). But see Jack F. Dunbar, Point-Counterpoint-Multidisciplinan Practice Translated
Means "Let's Kill All the Lawyers," 79 MICH. BAR J. 64, 67 (2000) (warning multidisciplinary
practice, or putting economic power in hands of nonlawyers, would lead to compensation
based on goal attainment rather than professional judgment).
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reducing their tuition or by improving the preparation of their
students for promising practice areas or by both means. If either the
tuition reductions or the diversion of faculty resources and energy
into teaching were significant, the resources devoted to the scholarly
enterprise would suffer accordingly.
If the ABA accreditation cartel refused to respond to these more
stringent economic conditions and maintained its costly input
standards and scholarship requirements, it would be likely that
schools faced with seriously falling enrollments would try to defect
from the cartel through several means, including joining in more
broadly focused anti-trust challenges to the ABA's rent-seeking
activities 74 and seeking to influence state supreme courts to open
bar admissions to graduates of law schools accredited by non-ABA
accrediting organizations. 75 Such schools could also be expected to
join with other constituencies in trying to reform the accreditation
process from within the ABA itself. In response to all of these
pressures, the ABA Section of Legal Education could engage in a
serious standards review process that would eliminate accreditation
74 See United States v. American Bar Ass'n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 435-36 (D.D.C. 1996)
(prohibiting ABA from adopting minimum salary compensation for law school faculty due to
antitrust violation). But see Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d
1026 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997) (refusing to find antitrust violation for
Massachusetts' failure to accredit law school).
75 See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 16-17 (1997-98) (listing
Alabama, California, Washington, D.C., Georgia and Maine as only states not allowing bar
admission to graduates of non-accredited law schools); Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 11,
at 2103 (stating almost all states require law degree from ABA accredited law school as fixed
prerequisite to taking bar examination).
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requirements that are not essential to the preparation of students for
practice. 76 By thereby opening the legal education market to
competition from legal educators who seriously want to experiment
with cost efficient educational models directed entirely to the goal of
preparing students for law practice, the reform of ABA accreditation
could result in far-reaching improvements in both the cost and
quality of the legal education and legal services available to all
Americans. Although I would not predict that this is likely to
happen in the near future, the trends in the global economic
marketplace away from inefficient enterprises dependent upon
governmental conferred rent-seeking privileges and towards
enterprises that must compete in an open market on the basis of
their cost-efficient delivery of high quality products does give a
measure of hope for the future of American legal education.
76 See STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 41-42 (1999) (containing ABA
Accreditation Standard 302); see also Stephen M. Johnson, www.lawschool.edu: Legal Education in
the Digital Age, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 85, 106 (2000) (noting Standard 302's requirement of practical
skills training and rise of law school courses in recent decades to reflect this, notably classes in
advanced research and writing, trial advocacy, interviewing and counseling, and dispute
resolution). But see Sandra A. Hansberger, The Road to Tomorrow: How Much Practical Skills
Instruction Should Law Students Get?, OR. ST. B. BULL. 9, 10 (noting Standard 302(a)(4)'s
requirement of offering professional skills instruction, but stating standard is left open as to
how much of curriculum should be devoted to practical skills).
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